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Having four pages at most to comment on a book consisting of fifteen different 
contributions is quite a challenge. It is even more daunting, I find, when the contributions 
are all featured in a volume that bears the generic title of “Philosophy of Education”. All 
this may seem to make it an unlikely candidate for a critical review. But the unlikelihood is 
in appearance only, given that the book in question forms part (specifically, “part” number 
29) of the Iberian-American Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Moreover, the authors of its 
chapters and the editor, professor Guillermo Hoyos Vásquez, are all well-known scholars in 
the area of the philosophy of education being written (and read) in Spanish and Portuguese 
on both sides of the Atlantic. These two circumstances alone clearly make the book worthy 
of study, and also make it particularly relevant on this occasion for inclusion in a 
publication of the characteristics of this monographic issue1. Its belonging is based on the 
fact that this volume well serves the purpose of providing a panoramic view of Iberian-
American contemporary philosophy of education. In the analysis that follows, I will try to 
connect the contributions by attending to their subject matter and approach, which in some 
cases will mean changing the order in which the chapters are originally presented. 
 
1. Education Confronting Postmodernity 
 
Those of us who live through the hot peninsular summers know well what happens to 
the earth when it goes from dry to arid and finally to parched and cracked. Also known, 
with the permission of Baumann, is how fluid and liquid the boundaries of our urbanite 
societies are in the 21st century. As Joan-Carles Mèlich highlights, it is a time in which we 
have accustomed ourselves to calling post-modern, and that “is born the instant a single 
truth decomposes into hundreds of relative truths that mankind divvies up. Not substance, 
nor God, nor causality, nor reason, nor subject, nor history” (p. 35). It is a philosophical 
time in which “there are only stories, tales, games, interpretations” (ibid.). The pedagogical 
consequences of this are, on one hand, that “human beings no longer find rules of learning 
in a transcendent world”, and on the other, that “all people must endow themselves with a 
history and invent their own existence” (ibid.). The subject is the protagonist and narrator 
of a story with an ending and multiple purposes. Neither philosophy nor philosophers can 
escape that fact. In order to reflect on education in today‟s world, Mèlich concludes that a 
post-modern education requires that teachers and students both be convinced “that there is 
no single unique language, no privileged language” (p. 51). As he says, “in a world where 
absolute truths have disappeared, meaning can not be discovered, but rather invented” (p. 
53). When the concept of truth enters a process of successive divisions, philosophical 
reflection seems to grasp onto a degree of material quality of the objects of study. Fernando 
Bárcena‟s text proposes thinking about the ambivalence and mistakenness of the body in its 
dual epistemic and existential mission. The body, in singular, is like the one that “expresses 
the events of the existence of a subject” (p. 251-252). Keeping this idea in mind in a 
pedagogical setting does not imply teaching the body in accordance with a set list of ideas, 
but rather, that “the body itself, in the events that occur to it, will be the one to provide new 
dimensions for the event of learning” (p. 252). The body is a space where we can give way 
to the meaning, be it painful-suffering or amorous-erotic, of what is happening to us. It is a 
passivity that can lead to the silencing of the logos, but that accentuates the testimony of the 
physical world, which does not speak but feels and “distorts our thinking” (p. 253). 
Recovering the body in singular, as a space for experiential learning, means remembering 
that we are beings who suffer. This restoration of the body will also remind us of the 
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possibility of thinking about it in its erotic dimension, “as an event at the most intense 
moment of a loving embrace” (p. 270). Living in corporal awareness, as Bárcena proposes, 
will enrich the biographical-temporal perception of our existence, since the body is not 
independent of our inner being: we are what we do, with all that we suffer and enjoy. In an 
exercise that also consists of questioning something we think we already know, Jorge 
Larrosa proposes “darkening what seems clear (…) making the reading matter even more 
mysterious and therefore more interesting” (p. 278). The chapter fulfils its intended aim: 
rather than offering answers to the meaning of the reading and plurality of texts, Larrosa 
launches a series of interlinked questions. First, if the reading is singular and the text is 
plural, does that make the reading experience become subjective and the plurality of the 
text polysemous? He says, “Is the subjectivity of the text not confused with a sort of weak 
subjectivism? (…) Does the plurality of the text belong to the text itself? (…) And if it 
does, is it enough to say that its meaning is always open to interpretation?” (p. 279). 
Second, is learning to speak the same as learning to translate? Translation, its practice and 
its theory, helps think about reading, its teaching and learning in another way. But third, 
beyond the understanding-translation of the text involved in the act of reading, wouldn‟t it 
be possible to think of reading beyond its communicative dimension? Isn‟t reading itself an 
experience? And more importantly from an educational point of view, “why do teaching 
apparatuses prize comprehension, why do psycho-technical and pedagogical texts on 
reading move exclusively within the framework of comprehension?” (p. 283). If, fourth, we 
state that reading is a translation experience, isn‟t reading something other that 
appropriation and dis-appropriation? When faced with a text, the reader appropriates it in 
his approach to the same extent that the text can make off with the vulnerability of the 
reader. Fifth, how is reading affected by there being myriad languages and the possibility of 
polyglotism? As well as being “Babel-esque” and plural, educational spaces become 
singular because of the presence of boys and girls in those spaces. Similarly, then, 
childhood can be the object of philosophical study. The work by Diego Antonio Pineda and 
Walter Omar Kohan makes a general presentation of the possible relationships between 
philosophy and childhood. The authors rescue from the history of philosophy what Plato, 
Montaigne and G. Mathews said about childhood. Then, they take us to the American 
philosopher Lipman‟s proposal centred on the philosophical education of childhood and 
that consists of presenting philosophy like a game, with its rules, in which everyone, 
including children, can play. The trouble with this philosophy for children, as the authors of 
the chapter point out, is precisely the concept of childhood underlying this entire 
educational project, as if still “wanting to see the adults of the future in children, who must 
be modelled after the pretensions of the adults of the present” (p. 311). To finish, they 
propose new ways of thinking of childhood “as the potential for multiplying possible 
childhoods and worlds, to open childhood and the world up to experience, evolution, 
events” (p. 316). 
 
2. Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Education 
 
Another line of work present in this collective piece is the study of education in ethics 
and morals. Marco Zingano gives a historical-philosophical overview of the concept of 
paideia in three classical Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. After a certain 
time, city-states such as Athens gave up their traditionalist perspective on preparing the new 
generations, introducing a new attitude “according to which reason (…) is what is divine in 
us, or is our most divine part, the part that makes us most like the gods” (p. 57). The 
specific consequences this new attitude brought to moral education of young people 
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fell into two groups: that “there is no space for a will independent from the 
acknowledgement of reasons for acting in a direction” (p. 58) and that “if doing something 
depends crucially on the beliefs that the agent has in relation to his action, then, prima 
facie, the moral training, no matter how complete, does not seem any different by nature 
from other teachings” (ibid.). The contribution of classical Athenian philosophy to this 
matter was key, since it uncovered the difference between learning what things are and 
wanting the best things. For Socrates, moral education was strongly intellectualised; and 
Plato went on to offer a more complete explanation of the subject‟s action by “introducing 
non-cognitive elements, typically emotional (e.g., wrath, appetite) with a relevant role for 
the decision that the agent has to take” (p. 63). However, it wasn‟t until Aristotle that 
relevance was given to emotions in the process of discovering what is best and wanting it, 
since emotions condition “the grasping of moral reasons in the life of men” (p. 73). That is 
perhaps why the Aristotelian perspective is viewed by many as being more “informative” 
for the purposes of pedagogic action. Related to moral and ethics education, we find the 
chapter written by Fernando Gil Cantero and Gonzalo Jover Olmeda. They propose 
exploring the “common horizon of humanization” (p. 230) portrayed by the convergence of 
education and human rights. However, despite the respect generally accorded to human 
rights, their effective integration nevertheless encounters a certain amount of resistance. 
The authors point to one of the possible causes as being the re-deployment of “the other 
languages of education” (p. 236) related with the “post-modern de-pedagogisation” (p. 237) 
in which, they say, pedagogy gives up any hope of mature knowledge so as to perpetuate 
itself in seductive adolescence (ibid.). Thus, they advocate that pedagogues should work 
from “the conviction that not all options are equally valid” (p. 238), trusting that 
“individuals can share some criteria that structures their common way of life” (ibid.). The 
educative relevance of an ethics of human rights is based on the pretence of universality 
with which international declarations on human rights are stated, which “does not refer so 
much to the values they espouse as to their valuing the human condition in its experience of 
happiness (p. 243). Close reading of legal texts on human rights, would represent a source 
of criticism, consciousness-raising and doubt for any educators who are ethically 
committed to their task. Universities have traditionally been in charge of training the 
intellectual elite along with noteworthy centres of cultural production and critique. Susana 
Villavicencio presents several philosophies of the university in order to reconsider its 
purposes and ideals in today‟s economic globalisation. She illustrates her analysis starting 
with the contribution from Jaspers, for whom the mission of the university “is the quest for 
truth in the community of researchers and disciples” (p. 323). Then, Habermas stated that 
“we have passed from the enlightened ideal of institutional autonomy and freedom of 
thought (…) to a weave of different functions in a single institution” (p. 326). But Derrida 
is the one who Villavicencio considers to be the rescuer of the sense and designs of the 
university in terms of responsibility. “Consideration of the purposes and responsibilities of 
the university (…), requires distinguishing what makes the university different” (p. 337). 
This difference lies in its ability to be different from the other institutions. Defending an 
active and autonomous stance of the university is key to achieving its own goals. 
 
3. Education and Freedom 
 
Reflecting on moral education requires considering the phenomenon of freedom in 
mankind. Newton Aquiles von Zuben and Silvio Gallo propose precisely that. Specifically, 
studying how freedom is related to “educational processes, according (…) to 
the political thought of Hannah Arendt and the proposal for a „liberating pedagogy‟” (p. 
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179) of the anarchist thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries. Both perspective are joined, 
according to the authors, by the socio-political approach they offer on the practice of 
freedom. Although Bakunin, Robin and Ferreri Guardia would no doubt disagree with 
Arendt‟s position that “draining education of any and all authority was a mistake in that it 
did nothing to help prepare children for a future life of equality in the political sphere” (p. 
201). Still, they would agree on “taking education as preparation for a political life founded 
on exercising one‟s freedom” (ibid.). In a quite different direction, Rodolfo Vázquez 
presents a liberal model of education as afacilitator of equal opportunities in the framework 
of a democratic State. Making a political reading of the theories of Rawls or Dewey, the 
author defends a mixed model of education, decentralised, democratic and pluralistic. But 
the title of the chapter (“Liberal and Democratic Education”) should not mislead, since that 
model is founded on a strong state intervention presided by equality and solidarity. He 
therefore advocates an “egalitarian liberal education” (p. 226) that deploys “all the means 
for the educand to discover the meaning of his or her social dimension” (ibid.). Eduardo 
Mendieta presents us with the South American tradition in pedagogy where education is 
understood as the practice of freedom, “as a praxis of liberation for the oppressed, excluded 
or outcast” (p. 341). The author makes an illustrative review of the intellectuals who 
promoted this way of understanding education. On Freire, he points out that at his core “we 
find a human figure as a creature of time” (p. 343), which is “what makes education a 
determining factor” (ibid.) for mankind. The final ending of the conversation that the two 
strike up will be awareness-raising: “we take conscious place in a historical and historised 
world by that very process of deliberated appropriation” (p.346). On Illich, Mendieta cites 
his de-schooling philosophy, founded on the double accusation that “education is confused 
with the awarding of diplomas and certificates” (p. 348), and that schooling has become 
“one of the main vehicles (…) of the modernization of poverty” (ibid.). Enrique Dussel and 
Juan Luis Segundo are representatives of analectic pedagogy aiming at freeing each and 
every person “from the inner transcendentality, exteriority or metaphysical difference that 
every human and cultural being possesses” (p. 352). And last, Borda and Bondy, according 
to Mendieta, represent “the best example of the appropriation of historical materialism from 
pedagogy” (p. 352). In their studies on the mechanisms of the geopolitics of knowledge, the 
production of contemporary knowledge not only reflects “passively the effects of 
colonisation and imperialism, but also participates actively in those processes” (p. 354). 
The pedagogy of liberation affords a chance to make a conscious critique of those processes 
and is especially capable of fight against them.  
 
4. Epistemological Reflections about Education 
 
The fourth group of papers is concerned with the epistemological dimension of 
education. Alejandro Ramírez Figueroa looks at the relations between epistemology, 
science and pedagogy. His main thesis is that “a correspondence can be established between 
the epistemological approaches and ways of understanding (…) what is teachable in a 
science; (…) [and] whether or not there is any independence between real science and 
learned science” (p. 77). The author looks to replace the justificationism in that regard, i.e., 
that the teaching of a science contributes nothing to science itself, since they are 
independent levels, and that what can be taught of a science are its formal procedures 
(contrasting hypotheses). With support from the contributions to the philosophy of science 
of Kuhn, Feyerbend and Hanson, he strives to show the difficulty of believing that when a 
science is taught, the science is learned just as it is. Science can indeed be taught, but what 
we learn are in fact “reconstructions” (p. 96). This chapter is followed by one by 
Philosophy of Education  
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
                                                                                                                 II Época, Nº 6 (2011):179-184           
                                       
184
Carlos Eduardo Vasco Uribe, Alberto Martinez Boom and Eloisa Vasco Montoya, whose 
aim is to “put into play some of the questions concerning epistemological thought on 
pedagogy and didactics” (p. 100). Their proposal consists of trying to differentiate between 
the realm of education as a practice situatedwithin the complexity of social contexts,and 
pedagogy or didactics as epistemological practices of knowledge. This attempt is 
complicated if not downright impossible, since it is hard to justify saying that “as such and 
such a social practice, education would not directly be an object of an epistemological 
reflection, but pedagogy, as with didactics, would in fact be an object of that reflection” (p. 
103). This ends by saying that “pedagogy and didactics are closer to teachers, to teacher 
trainers and to students of education, whereas education itself, as the current slogan goes, 
„is everybody‟s business‟” (p. 124). This willingness to differentiation that moves them is 
rather extreme. That is how Javier Sáenz Obregón would understand it. He defends 
pedagogy as a field of knowledge and practice. His proposal focuses on “analysing two 
historical events in which philosophy was taken as education” (p. 157). He finds the 
historical background for this way of thinking of philosophy as pedagogy first in the 
educational practices that accompanied the start-up of schools in the 16th century, when 
pedagogues took the classical concept of method to move “towards the simplification of the 
presentation of the teaching materials by establishing more efficient procedures (…) and 
organising the contents according to its nature” (p. 160). Second, it is found in the works of 
John Dewey on the relationship between pedagogy and philosophy. Pragmatic positions on 
knowledge lead to understanding that philosophy is no more and no less than a general 
theory of education “not only embodied and thus inseparable from formative practices, but 
a theory whose meaning and worth are played out on their formative action of subjects” (p. 
164). Sáenz Obregón considers these antecedents as elements that encourage optimism to 
improve communication between the camps of theory and practice in education. This is a 
dialogue “that inevitably requires reconstituting the job of teacher” (p. 173). The relations 
between knowing, teaching and learning are being widely shaken by the presence of the 
new information technologies (NIT). Thus, José Gimeno Sacristán gives a rich reflection 
on the relationship between technology and education. He begins with the different ways of 
understanding technology in the educational setting: as a method, instrumental medium, 
model of rationality and means of communication. But “what do we understand by 
education when it comes to posing its relationships with technology?” (p. 139) he later 
asks. Despite the advantages of more and faster exchanges of information, Gimeno 
Sacristán fears that “difficulties may arise in generating suitable learning environments” (p. 
145). But the most important challenge posed by advances in NIT to education is that it is 
occurring outside the school: “If adopting and using NIT takes place outside school, it not 
only means NIT are no longer subject to educational criteria but that the right to education 
has other settings for being carried out and depends on different agents other than schools, 
whose control is very difficult” (p. 155). 
The miscellaneous nature of the contributions included in this volume creates a certain 
lack of unity. The itinerary followed throughout this “stroll through different philosophical 
traditions” announced by the editor in the introduction is not at all clear. This may be 
something to be expected from being part of an Iberian-American encyclopaedia of 
philosophy. And yet, reading it offers a plural panorama, rich and extensive in nuances from 
main lines of work in the philosophy of education written in the Iberian-American linguistic 
setting. That is more than enough good reason to encourage its being read and studied. 
 
